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Abstract
On June 24th, Governor Cooper announced that North Carolina will not be moving into Phase
3 of its reopening process at least until July 17th. Given the recent increases in daily positive
cases and hospitalizations, this decision was not surprising. However, given the political and
economic pressures which are forcing the state to reopen, it is not clear what actions will help
North Carolina to avoid the worst. We use a compartmentalized model to study the effects of
social distancing measures and testing capacity combined with contact tracing on the evolution
of the pandemic in North Carolina until the end of the year. We find that going back to
restrictions that were in place during Phase 1 will slow down the spread but if the state wants
to continue to reopen or at least remain in Phase 2 or Phase 3 it needs to significantly expand its
testing and contact tracing capacity. Even under our best-case scenario of high contact tracing
effectiveness, the number of contact tracers the state currently employs is inadequate.
1. Background
This report provides a summary of our analysis into how social distancing measures along with
testing and contact tracing capacity will likely impact the evolution of COVID-19 pandemic within
the state of North Carolina until the end of 2020. This analysis is based on a model, which was
first introduced in [4], a report on the findings of a similar study conducted for New York City. For
the convenience of the reader, this paper is prepared as a self-contained document that includes
a complete description of the mathematical model and therefore parts of it which pertain to the
mathematical model in general overlap with [4].
The first COVID-19 case in North Carolina was identified on March 3rd and the state of
emergency was declared on March 10th. On March 30th, statewide stay-at-home order was put in
place and non-essential businesses were ordered closed. These orders stayed in place until May 8th.
Starting with that date, the state entered Phase 1 of its reopening process. On May 22nd, Phase
2 took effect with a scheduled end date of June 26th. However, on June 24th, Governor Cooper
announced that this date has been pushed three weeks into the future, to July 17th. It is not clear
whether the state will indeed move to Phase 3 on that date or it will be postponed again.
Over the last few weeks, North Carolina has experienced significant increases in the number
of new cases and hospitalizations as the state has continued to lift restrictions. At the same
time, pressures that have forced the officials and other administrators to open up the economy
(economical, political, or otherwise) appear to be still there and it is not clear what course of action
will help balance the competing priorities. Our objective is to investigate the impact of different
social distancing measures the state might choose to put in place in the future, whether increases
in state’s testing capacity might help in mitigating the impact of reopening on hospitalizations
and deaths, and what resource demands will be needed for contact tracing. In the following, we
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topaloglu@orie.cornell.edu, and ziya@email.unc.edu.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
04
76
5v
1 
 [q
-b
io.
PE
]  
3 J
ul 
20
20
summarize our main findings. For a broad description of our mathematical model, see Section 7.
For details, see the Appendix.
2. Move Forward to Phase 3, Stay in Phase 2, or Go Back to Phase 1?
We do not know the exact current testing capacity in North Carolina, however, the data indicate
that the maximum number of tests performed on a single day is between 25,000 and 30,000.
Therefore, we chose a testing capacity of 30,000 per day as the base case. We also do not know what
the testing capacity will be in the future but to get a sense of the impact of the test availability on
controlling the spread of the disease, we considered 60,000 per day as an alternative scenario. The
top and bottom panels of Figure 1 respectively provide the trajectory of projected daily deaths
under the testing capacity of 30,000 per day and 60,000 per day. Each data series in the two panels
corresponds to a different level of social distancing that will be practiced starting with July 17th.
We consider three possibilities: moving to Phase 3, staying in Phase 2, or going back to Phase 1 all
assumed to be in place until the end of the year. It is important to note that we do not expect the
state to stick with any one of these three choices until the end of the year, however, comparing the
projection under each scenario provides some insights into what kind of impact each one of these
choices will have on the disease’s spread.
As we can see from the blue curve in the top panel of the figure, with a testing capacity of
30,000 tests per day, moving to Phase 3 will likely be disastrous with a major peak that will arrive
some time in early November and a projected number of deaths of approximately 160,000 by the
end of the year. (Labels on the right end of each panel give the total number of deaths by the end of
2020.) In fact, such a major peak would mean that hospitals would be overwhelmed to such a level
that they may not be able to provide their regular level of care and the mortality rates might end
up being more than what the data to date suggest and our analysis assumes. If the state chooses
to stay in Phase 2, there will surely be fewer deaths, however, we predict that there will still be a
significant increase in daily deaths and hospitalizations compared with current levels with a peak
in December.
From the bottom panel, we can see that having more tests would definitely help resulting in
fewer deaths but even a capacity of 60,000 tests per day will not be sufficient to prevent a major
wave of hospitalizations and deaths in Fall. The figure suggests that what will help in reining in
the spread of the disease is going back to the restrictions that were in place in Phase 1 regardless
of whether the testing capacity is 30,000 or 60,000. It appears that increasing testing capacity (at
least to 60,000) will not help mitigate the impact of relaxing social distancing measures.
3. A Closer Look into Testing Capacity and Social Distancing: What Might Help?
The discussion in the previous section suggests that even if the state does not move into Phase 3
and stays in Phase 2 until the end of the year, hospitalizations and deaths will soar over the next
few months even if the daily testing capacity increases to 60,000. Moving back to Phase 1 would
help but given the highly likely economic impact of taking such an action it might be helpful to
consider alternatives. In particular, it is of interest to investigate what levels of testing capacity
might be sufficient for different levels of social distancing that might possibly be experienced in the
coming months as a result of different policies that might be employed.
Figure 2 shows the trade-offs between the total number of deaths by the end of the year and
the level of social distancing to be practiced post July 17th, under different testing capacities. The
horizontal axis shows the level of social distancing, expressed as a percentage relaxation in the
social distancing norms in reference to what was experienced before Phase 1 under the stay-at-
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30,000 tests per day
60,000 tests per day
Figure 1: Trajectory of the daily deaths under testing capacities of 30,000 and 60,000 per day.
3
Figure 2: Trade-offs between the deaths by the end of 2020 and the social distancing norms.
home order. Thus, 0% corresponds to stay-at-home, whereas 100% is full relaxation, corresponding
to life before the pandemic with no restrictions in place. Social distancing levels that correspond
to Phases 1, 2, and 3 are also marked on the x-axis so that the reader can get a sense of roughly
what different social distancing levels correspond to. (Social distancing levels in Phase 1, 2, and
3 respectively correspond to 25%, 50%, and 75%, which is in line with social distancing estimates
in [6].) The vertical axis shows the total number of projected deaths by the end of 2020. Each
data series corresponds to a different level of testing capacity. Our analysis assumes that new
testing capacity and social distancing norms become effective on July 17th. In computing these
projections, we use the reported number of tests performed on each day up to June 15th. Between
June 15 and July 17 we assume 30,000 tests are conducted daily.
Current discussions and political and economical climate in the state suggest that going back
to Phase 1 is not being considered as a serious possibility at least in the near future. In fact,
with planned opening of the schools and colleges in late summer, the state is on path to further
opening. This suggests that, it would make sense to pay more attention to the right half of Figure
2, the part that corresponds to relaxation levels that are larger than 50%, i.e., either staying at
Phase 2 or moving further to Phase 3 and beyond. There, we can observe that having more tests
available everyday would make a significant difference. To be clear, having more tests cannot be a
substitute for social distancing. As we can see from the figure, even under the daily testing capacity
of 200,000, the total number of deaths by the end of the year would be very large. Social distancing
appears to be the only way to keep the spread under control. Still, it is important to note that
even if more tests will likely not alter the dynamics of the disease’s spread it will at least help in
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keeping the numbers smaller.
4. Testing Capacity and the Effectiveness of Contact Tracing
One important point to highlight about our model is that it assumes that there is a contact tracing
policy in place. More specifically, it assumes that close contacts of individuals who test positive are
identified and they are asked to self-isolate, which helps in reducing new infections in the population.
In fact, this is the main reason why in our model more testing helps. Without contact tracing, the
benefit of having more tests beyond a certain level would be minimal. Our analysis makes certain
assumptions about the effectiveness of contact tracing but there is in fact significant uncertainty
around this issue. To partially address this uncertainty, we consider alternative scenarios in regards
to contact tracing effectiveness and investigate the changes in our projections. (As we explain in
the Appendix, because we are not aware of any studies on contact tracing in the United States,
we used a study conducted in China to come up with a rough approximation for a parameter that
captures the contact tracing effectiveness.)
We control the effectiveness of contact tracing via the parameter CTEP, which stands for
Contact Tracing Effectiveness Parameter. For details on CTEP, we refer the reader to the
Appendix, where likOfBeingInfected is used for CTEP, but it might be useful for the reader
to know that CTEP is basically an indicator of how successful contact tracing is in identifying
asymptomatic infected individuals over the non-infected ones. If CTEP = 1, this means that
contact tracing is of no use at all and higher values of CTEP indicate higher likelihood of identifying
infected people or more effective contact tracing.
Our analysis above assumed CTEP = 5 based on our rough approximation for the parameter.
Figure 3 considers two additional cases, one with CTEP = 2 and the other with CTEP = 10 all
under the assumption that the state will continue to operate in Phase 2 until the end of the year.
Figure 3: Impact of Contact Tracing Effectiveness on Projections for the Daily Number of Deaths.
Not surprisingly, when contact tracing is more effective, number of deaths decline considerably.
Nevertheless, even when CTEP = 10, we project a very large number of deaths and hospitalizations
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by the end of the year with a major peak in late Fall. However, it is important to remind the reader
that, in fact, we do not know how effective contact tracing is or will be in the future and it is possible
that even setting CTEP to 10 might be underestimating the actual effectiveness. We do hope that
is the case as that would suggest that, given the substantial decreases in the projected number
of deaths with increased contact tracing efficiency and perhaps combined with increased testing
capacity, the state might be able to keep the spread somewhat under control. The critical question
in that case would be whether the state has the sufficient resources for contact tracing. This is
what we investigate next.
5. Projected Resource Needs for Contact Tracing
There are mainly two components of contact tracing. First, close contacts of individuals who test
positive are identified and tracers contact these individuals informing them about the possibility
of their having been infected and giving them directions as to what they need to do over a period
of roughly two weeks. Second, during this period, when these close contacts need to self-isolate
(unless they are tested and result comes negative), tracers periodically contact them to check up
on their conditions and ensure that they are self-isolating. Figure 4 shows our daily projections for
new cases, who need to be interviewed to determine their close contacts while Figure 5 shows our
projections for the number of individuals who need follow-up calls from contact tracers.
Figure 4: Projections of Daily Number of New Positive Cases.
Again, we can see from the figures that contact tracing resource needs peak some time in Fall
regardless of how effective tracing is, however, the effectiveness has a significant impact on the
number of tracers that would be needed. For the mid-range effectiveness scenario, where CTEP =
5, the maximum value for the number of daily new positive cases is 7,121 whereas the maximum
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Figure 5: Projections of Daily Number of Isolated Individuals who Need Follow-up.
value for the number of isolated individuals who need follow-up is 127,617. According to the
estimates by the Fitzhugh Mullan Institute for Health Workforce Equity of the George Washington
University, a single contact tracer, assuming an 8-hr workday, would be able to interview six index
cases (individuals who test positive), or make 12 initial contact notifications, or make 32 follow-up
calls [5]. This would then mean that North Carolina would need roughly 7,550 contact tracers.
(This number is very close to 7,700, the current estimate by the Fitzhugh Mullan Institute). Our
estimate would be roughly 11,630 for CTEP = 2, and 2,860 for CTEP = 10. According to recent
reports [14], North Carolina has roughly 1,500 contact tracers meaning that even under our more
optimistic scenario of high contact tracing effectiveness, the state’s tracing resources would fall
short of meeting the demand.
6. Discussion
Our main objective in this work has not been to make precise predictions for key metrics like
number of deaths, number of hospitalizations etc. but rather to understand the dynamics of the
spread of the disease, how these dynamics would depend on the state’s testing and contact tracing
capacity, and provide insights into whether the existing capacity is sufficient for the state to reopen
without overwhelming its healthcare resources. Therefore, the reader should take the precise
values of the estimates we report in this paper with a grain of salt but give credence and pay
more attention to the insights we generated through their analysis collectively. Unfortunately, this
analysis strongly suggests that even if North Carolina does not move to Phase 3 on July 17th,
without further restrictions, the number of new cases, hospitalizations and deaths will continue to
increase substantially peaking some time in Fall.
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There are several ways that this grim prediction may not become reality. One possibility is
for the state to reimpose some of the restrictions that were in place in Phase 1 of the reopening.
Alternatively, of course, the state might continue with is reopening plan but take other actions that
would significantly limit person-to-person transmission such as enforcing face covering requirements
more strictly. The goal here should be to bring down the transmission rate at least to the levels
achieved under Phase 1. The current economic and political climate in North Carolina suggests
that reimposing restrictions is not very likely and it is not clear whether strict requirements for
face coverings could keep new infections down as the state keeps opening.
If the state continues with its reopening plan with no further restrictions, there appears to be
only one way the spread of the disease can be kept under control and that is through extensive
testing combined with effective contact tracing. There is some uncertainty as to how effective
contact tracing will be but it is safe to say that North Carolina is significantly understaffed to keep
up with the workload that will be generated for contact tracers over the next few months. Therefore,
it is essential for the state to quickly hire new contact tracers to keep up with the impending jump
in their workload and ensure that contact tracing is effective in identifying infected individuals and
prevent them from infecting others in the community. It is also important to understand that testing
capacity and contact tracing capacity are directly tied to each other and any meaningful response
should include increasing both in some proportional manner. Beyond certain levels of testing
capacity, further increases will not bring much benefit if contact tracers are already overwhelmed.
Similarly, hiring more contact tracers will be meaningless unless the state continues to test at
certain numbers everyday.
Without further action from the state, one possibility that could alter our predictions is that,
with the increased public awareness around how the disease spreads, the infection rates for different
phases might end up being lower than what we assumed in our analysis based on the mobility data.
It is also possible that over the next few months, the disease’s spread might follow a course that
is quite different from what we observed so far. This may not necessarily be a result of some form
of mutation in the virus but could simply be a result of the changes in the demographics of the
population who is infected by the virus over time. In fact, our analysis of the most recent data
from North Carolina suggests that there appears to be some drop in the overall mortality rate and
this appears to be a national trend. Recent news articles reported that median age of individuals
who test positive has dropped substantially since March [13] and such a change in the infected
population would reduce hospitalization and mortality rates. (Interestingly, in North Carolina,
even though we observe a drop in mortality rates, hospitalization rate appears to not have changed
in any significant manner.) If this trend continues, it is possible that the scale of the problem we will
face will be smaller than what we expect based on our analysis. However, it is important to keep in
mind that younger individuals who tend to be mostly asymptomatic and are more socially active,
can spread the virus more easily to different segments of the population, which might increase the
hospitalization and mortality rates back up again. In any case, it would be prudent to not put our
hopes on possibilities that are beyond our control but take actions that would help even under the
worst circumstances.
7. Outline of the Mathematical Model
Our model follows the standard susceptible-infected-recovered paradigm with compartments
capturing individuals classified along the dimensions of infected, noninfected, and recovered, as
well as symptomatic-isolated, asymptomatic-isolated, and asymptomatic-nonisolated. Once an
individual is tested positive, a certain number of individuals who are expected to have been in close
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contact with the positive individual are transferred to a certain isolated compartment. In this way,
we build a contact tracing mechanism to ensure that those who have been in contact with a positive
individual reduce their contact with the rest of the population. Running our model with a starting
date of March 2, we get a trajectory of the pandemic that is in reasonably close agreement with
the actual trajectory in North Carolina so far. In the appendix, we give a discussion of our model
and provide comparisons of its output with the actual trajectory of the pandemic.
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Appendix
The appendix is organized as follows. In Appendix A, we discuss our model at a high level. This
section avoids any technical details but it is useful for seeing how our model works, what
compartments it uses, and how the different compartments interact with each other. In Appendix B,
we provide the full mathematical details of our model. In Appendix C, we elaborate on the
parameters of our model and how they are estimated. We borrow some of the parameters from the
literature and derive others based off of problem primitives. We explain how we arrive at the derived
model parameters. In Appendix D, we compare the output of our model with the trajectory of the
pandemic in North Carolina until early May and demonstrate that our model does a reasonably
good job of predicting the trajectory that has been observed so far.
A. Model at a High Level
In our model, we capture the two benefits of testing, which are isolating the specific individual
tested positive and tracing the contacts of the positive individual. In particular, our model
distinguishes the infected individuals who know that they are infected from the infected individuals
who do not know whether they are infected. Once a person is tested positive, this person
is an infected individual who knows that she is infected. Such a person minimally infects
others. Moreover, considering the individuals who do not know whether they are infected, we
classify them as symptomatic-isolated, asymptomatic-isolated, or asymptomatic-nonisolated. Once
an individual is tested positive, a certain number of people around this person are classified
as asymptomatic-isolated people, so these individuals reduce their contact with the general
population, preventing them from infecting others to some extent.
Our model follows the standard susceptible-infected-recovered modeling paradigm. In Figure 6,
we show the compartments in our model. The boxes represent the compartments. The arrows
represent the possible flows between the compartments. The three compartments on the right of
the figure capture the individuals who know that they are infected. In particular, the compartment
labeled “KI” corresponds to the infected individuals who know that they are infected and not (yet)
hospitalized. The compartment labeled “H” captures the infected individuals who are hospitalized.
The individuals in the latter compartment also know that they are infected. The compartment
labeled “KR” captures the recovered individuals who knew that they were infected. Perhaps
optimistically, in our model, the individuals in all of these three compartments minimally infect
others, since they are aware that they were infected.
The nine compartments on the left side of the figure capture the individuals who do not know
whether they are infected. Some of these individuals will, in actuality, be infected, some will
be noninfected, and some will even have recovered without knowing they had been infected. We
classify the individuals who do not know whether they are infected along two dimensions. In
the first dimension, any such individual could be symptomatic-isolated, asymptomatic-isolated, or
asymptomatic-nonisolated. Asymptomatic-nonisolated individuals do not show symptoms of the
disease and do not make an effort to reduce their contact. Asymptomatic-isolated individuals make
a conscious effort to reduce their contact, mainly because they have been in touch with a person
who tested positive. Symptomatic-isolated individuals show symptoms but do not know whether
they are infected. Their symptoms may be due to other diseases.
Once again, perhaps optimistically, in our model, all symptomatic individuals isolate themselves,
so we do not have a compartment for symptomatic-nonisolated people. Symptomatic-isolated
and asymptomatic-isolated individuals infect others with a smaller rate, when compared with
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KI
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Asymptomatic 
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Non-isolated
KR
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Recovery
D
Death
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RSi
RAi
RAn
NSi
NAi
NAn
Figure 6: Compartments used in our model.
asymptomatic-nonisolated people. When stricter social distancing norms are enforced, all
individuals will reduce their contact with the general population, but we follow the assumption
that asymptomatic-nonisolated individuals will still maintain a higher contact rate with the rest of
the population than asymptomatic-isolated and symptomatic-isolated individuals.
Considering the individuals who do not know whether they are infected, we classify them along
another dimension. In this second dimension, an individual who does not know whether she is
infected could be infected, noninfected, or recovered. Thus, considering the nine compartments on
the left side of Figure 6, the compartment labeled “IAn,” for example, captures the infected and
asymptomatic-nonisolated individuals who do not know whether they are infected. Note that these
individuals are infected in actuality, but they do not know that they are infected and they maintain
a high contract rate with the rest of the population, being nonisolated. When we perform tests on
a segment of a population, the proportion of positive tests is given by the fraction of the infected
individuals in the segment relative to the size of the whole segment. For example, using the label
of a compartment to also denote the number of individuals in the compartment, since there are
NAn + RAn + IAn asymptomatic-nonisolated individuals, if we test T asymptomatic-nonisolated
individuals, then the number of positive tests is T × IAnNAn+RAn+IAn .
So far, we indicated two reasons for our model to be optimistic. In addition, our model assumes
that close contacts of every positive case are traced and these close contacts remain in isolation
for 14 days or until they are tested negative. In other words, our model implicitly assumes that
the bottleneck is the testing capacity, not contact tracing capacity. It is important to note that
growing the testing capacity in the state beyond a certain level without growing the contact tracing
capacity will not be of much benefit, so any decision regarding how much to grow the contact tracing
capacity should be directly informed by the plans to grow the testing capacity.
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B. Mathematical Description of the System Dynamics
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the system dynamics of our model. The state
of the system at each time period t is described by a vector(
ItSi, I
t
Ai, I
t
An, R
t
Si, R
t
Ai, R
t
An, N
t
Si, N
t
Ai, N
t
An, D
t,Ht,KIt,KRt
)
,
where the variables ItSi, I
t
Ai, I
t
An, R
t
Si, R
t
Ai, R
t
An, N
t
Si, N
t
Ai, N
t
An denote the states associated with the
nine compartments on the left side of Figure 6. These nine compartments correspond to individuals
whose COVID-19 status is unknown. The variable Dt denotes the number of individuals who die
in period t, and the variableHt denotes the number of individuals who are hospitalized in period t.
The variable KIt captures the number of individuals who have been confirmed to have COVID-19
and are currently infected in period t. The variable KRt captures the number of individuals who
have been confirmed to have COVID-19 and recovered by period t.
Description of Sub-compartments: For our state variables, we use regular font to denote
scalars and bold font to denote vectors. We use vector notation when a compartment has multiple
sub-compartments representing different subgroups of the population. Here are the descriptions of
the sub-compartments.
• Sub-compartments within the ISi compartment: The ISi compartment has 3 sub-compartments:
(a) those who will recover naturally without requiring any hospitalization, (b) those who will
require hospitalization, and (c) those who will die without access to a COVID-19 diagnostic test.
Thus,
ItSi =
(
ItSi(recovered), I
t
Si(hospitalized), I
t
Si(death)
)
.
We use the notation I¯tSi = I
t
Si(recovered) + I
t
Si(hospitalized) + I
t
Si(death) to denote the total
number of individuals in the ISi compartment. The trick we use here is that when an individual
is infected, we immediately decide whether this person will recover, will be hospitalized, or will
die. We keep the identity of the individual accordingly throughout the simulation.
• Sub-compartments within the IAi compartment: The IAi compartment has 2 sub-compartments:
(a) those who will never develop COVID-19 symptoms, and (b) those who will show COVID-19
symptoms but are currently pre-symptomatic. Thus,
ItAi =
(
ItAi(recovered), I
t
Ai(show symptom)
)
,
and we let I¯tAi = I
t
Ai(recovered) + I
t
Ai(show symptom) denote the total number of individuals
in the IAi compartment.
• Sub-compartments within the IAn compartments: Similar to the IAi compartment, the IAn
compartment has 2 sub-compartments: (a) those who will never develop COVID-19 symptoms,
and (b) those who will show COVID-19 symptoms but are currently pre-symptomatic. Thus,
ItAn =
(
ItAn(recovered), I
t
An(show symptom)
)
,
and as before, we let I¯tAn = I
t
An(recovered) + I
t
An(show symptom) denote the total number of
individuals in the IAn compartment.
• Sub-compartments within the H compartment: The H compartment consists of two types of
individuals: (a) those who will die and (b) those who will eventually recover. Thus, we have
Ht =
(
Ht(die), Ht(recovered)
)
.
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• Sub-compartments within the KI compartment: The KI compartment consists of two types
of individuals: (a) those who will require hospitalization and (b) those who will recover without
visiting a hospital. Therefore, we have that KIt =
(
KIt(hospitalized),KIt(recovered)
)
.
Impact of Testing: We assume that the diagnostic test is 100% accurate and the result is
obtained instantaneously. However when we perform the test, we cannot differentiate between
unknown infected, unknown non-infected, and recovered people. We can only test people based on
their observable characteristics. At the beginning of each period, we test TSi symptomatic-isolated
individuals, TAi asymptomatic-isolated individuals, and TAn asymptomatic-nonisolated individuals.
We assume that the tests are administered at random within each of these populations. Let piSi, piAi,
and piAn denote the fraction of symptomatic isolated, asymptomatic isolated, and asymptomatic
non-isolated individuals, respectively, who receive diagnostic tests. Then,
piSi = min
{
T tSi
I¯tSi − ItSi(death) + RtSi + N tSi
, 1
}
,
piAi = min
{
T tAi
I¯tAi + R
t
Ai +N
t
Ai
, 1
}
,
piAn = min
{
T tAn
I¯tAn + R
t
An +N
t
An
, 1
}
.
The above fractions drive the dynamics across compartments, which are described below based
on the events that can occur in our model. In the fraction piSi, we assume that the infected
symptomatic-isolated individuals from the death sub-compartment are inaccessible for testing.
Description of Dynamics Between Compartments: Our description below is organized
by the compartments. For each compartment, we describe the inflows, outflows, and the new state
at time period t+ 1.
• Infected Symptomatic-Isolated Compartment (ISi): As noted earlier, the ISi compartment
has 3 subgroups of individuals: (a) those who will recover naturally without requiring any
hospitalization, (b) those who require hospitalization, and (c) those who die without access
to a COVID-19 diagnostic test. Thus,
ItSi =
(
ItSi(recovered), I
t
Si(hospitalized), I
t
Si(death)
)
,
and I¯tSi = I
t
Si(recovered) + I
t
Si(hospitalized) + I
t
Si(death) denotes the total number of individuals
across the three sub-compartments.
Inflow: The inflow to the ISi compartment consists of 3 sources given by:
– Non-infected symptomatic-isolated (NSi) individuals who did not get tested and were newly
infected during period t. The number of such individuals is given by
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tSi (1− piSi) ,
where I¯tAn(1−piAn)+ I¯tAi (1−piAi)+ I¯tSi (1−piSi) represents the infected population who remains
untested, and β` represents the effective contact rate among isolated individuals. See Section
C for more details.
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– Infected asymptomatic-nonisolated (IAn) individuals who become symptomatic. The total
inflow of such individuals is given by
ItAn(show symptom)
infToSympTime
,
where infToSympTime represents the average number of days until an infected person displays
symptoms. In our model, we set infToSympTime to be 5 days; see Section C for more details.
– Infected asymptomatic-isolated (IAi) individuals who become symptomatic. Using a similar
logic as above, the total amount of such inflow is given by
ItAi(show symptom)
infToSympTime
.
We assume that a fraction hospOutOfSympFrac, currently set at 20%, of the total inflow to the
ISi compartment will require hospitalization, and a fraction deathOutOfSympFrac (2%) will die
without being tested. The remaining 1 − hospOutOfSympFrac − deathOutOfSympFrac = 78%
will recover at home. Justifications for these fractions are given in Section C.
Outflow: There are four destinations for the outflow from the ISi compartment.
– Individuals in the “recovered” sub-compartment, ItSi(recovered), will move to the recovered
asymptomatic-nonisolated (RAn) compartment at the rate of 1/sympToRecoveryTime, where
sympToRecoveryTime represents the average time for a symptomatic individual to recover from
the disease. Currently, sympToRecoveryTime is set at 14 days.
– Individuals in the “hospitalized” sub-compartment, ItSi(hospitalized), will move to the H
compartment at the rate of 1/sympToHospTime, where sympToHospTime (5 days) represents
the average number of days from symptom onset until hospitalization.
– Individuals in the “death” sub-compartment, ItSi(death), will move to the death compartment
(D) at the rate of 1/sympToDeathTime, where sympToDeathTime (14 days) denotes the average
time from symptoms onset to death.
– Finally, a fraction piSi in every sub-compartment will move to the known infected
(KI) compartment due to testing.
Update Equations: Let recoverOutOfSympFrac = 1−hospOutOfSympFrac−deathOutOfSympFrac.
We have the following update equations.
It+1Si (recovered)
= ItSi(recovered)× (1− piSi)×
(
1− 1
sympToRecoveryTime
)
+ recoverOutOfSympFrac×
[
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tSi (1− piSi)
+
ItAn(show symptom)(1− piAn)
infToSympTime
+
ItAi(show symptom)(1− piAi)
infToSympTime
]
,
It+1Si (hospitalized)
= ItSi(hospitalized)× (1− piSi)×
(
1− 1
sympToHospTime
)
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+ hospOutOfSympFrac×
[
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tSi (1− piSi)
+
ItAn(show symptom)(1− piAn)
infToSympTime
+
ItAi(show symptom)(1− piAi)
infToSympTime
]
,
It+1Si (death)
= ItSi(death)× (1− piSi)×
(
1− 1
sympToDeathTime
)
+ deathOutOfSympFrac×
[
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tSi (1− piSi)
+
ItAn(show symptom)(1− piAn)
infToSympTime
+
ItAi(show symptom)(1− piAi)
infToSympTime
]
.
• Infected Asymptomatic-Isolated Compartment (IAi): We have two sub-compartments
with ItAi =
(
ItAi(recovered), I
t
Ai(show symptom)
)
, and I¯tAi = I
t
Ai(recovered) + I
t
Ai(show symptom)
denotes the total number of individuals across the two sub-compartments.
Inflow: The inflow to the IAi compartment has two sources:
– Non-infected asymptomatic-isolated (NAi) individuals who were not tested and became newly
infected during period t. The number of such individuals is given by
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tAi (1− piAi) ,
where β` denotes the effective contact rate for isolated individuals.
– Infected asymptomatic-nonisolated (IAn) individuals who were not tested but were identified
as a close contact of a positive case. These individuals voluntarily self isolate and reduce their
contact rate with others. The number of such individuals is given by
contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× likOfBeingInfected× I¯tAn(1− piAn) ,
where contactPerPosCase is the average number of contacts per positive case, currently set
at 4, whereas I¯tSipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn denotes the number of positive cases identified that time
period and H¯ is given by
H¯ =
(
likOfBeingInfected× I¯tAn(1− piAn)
)
+ (RtAn + R
t
SipiSi + R
t
AipiAi) + (N
t
An + N
t
SipiSi + N
t
AipiAi) ,
where the parameter likOfBeingInfected measures the likelihood that a contacted individual
is in the infected population as compared to the non-infected and recovered populations. We
set likOfBeingInfected at 5.
We assume that a fraction symptomFrac, currently set at 50%, of the total inflow to the IAi
compartment will develop symptoms, and the remaining 1−symptomFrac = 50% will not develop
any symptoms.
Outflow: There are three destinations for the outflow from the IAi compartment.
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– The individuals in the “recovered” sub-compartment, ItAi(recovered), will move to the RAn
compartment at the rate of 1/asympToRecoveryTime. The parameter asympToRecoveryTime
represents the average time that an asymptomatic infected person self-isolates after being
identified as a close contact. We currently set this value to 10 days.
– The “show symptom” sub-compartment, ItAi(show symptom), will move to the ISi
compartment at the rate of 1/infToSympTime, where infToSympTime (5 days) is the average
time until symptom onset.
– A fraction piAi of individuals who are tested will move to the known infected
(KI) compartment.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
It+1Ai (recovered)
= ItAi(recovered)× (1− piAi)×
(
1− 1
asympToRecoveryTime
)
+ (1− symptomFrac)×
[
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tAi (1− piAi)
+ contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× likOfBeingInfected× I¯tAn(1− piAn)
]
,
It+1Ai (show symptom)
= ItAi(show symptom)× (1− piAi)×
(
1− 1
infToSympTime
)
+ symptomFrac×
[
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tAi (1− piAi)
+ contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× likOfBeingInfected× I¯tAn(1− piAn)
]
.
• Infected Asymptomatic-Nonisolated Compartment (IAn): We have two sub-
compartments, ItAn =
(
ItAn(recovered), I
t
An(show symptom)
)
, and we denote the total number
of individuals across the two sub-compartments as I¯tAn = I
t
An(recovered) + I
t
An(show symptom).
Inflow: The inflow to the IAn compartment comes from non-infected asymptomatic-nonisolated
NAn individuals who become newly infected during period t. The number of such individuals is
given by (
βhI¯
t
An(1− piAn) + β`I¯tAi (1− piAi) + β`I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tAn (1− piAn) ,
where βh represents the effective contact rate among nonisolated individuals. See Section C for
more details. We assume that a fraction symptomFrac, currently set at 50%, of the total inflow
to the IAn compartment will develop symptom, and the remaining 1− symptomFrac = 50% will
not develop any symptoms.
Outflow: The outflow from the IAn compartment has four destinations.
– The individuals in the “recovered” sub-compartment, ItAn(recovered), will move to the RAn
compartment at the rate of 1/asympToRecoveryTime.
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– The individuals in the “show symptom” sub-compartment, ItAn(show symptom), will move to
the ISi compartment at the rate of 1/infToSympTime.
– Some individuals who were not tested will reduce their contacts and move to the IAi
compartment. The number of such individuals is
contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× likOfBeingInfected× I¯tAn(1− piAn) .
– A fraction piAn of individuals are tested and moved to the known infected KI compartment.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
It+1An (recovered)
= ItAn(recovered)× (1− piAn)×
(
1− 1
asympToRecoveryTime
− contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× likOfBeingInfected
)
+ (1 − symptomFrac)×
[(
βhI¯
t
An(1− piAn) + β`I¯tAi (1− piAi) + β`I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tAn (1− piAn)
]
,
It+1An (show symptom)
= ItAn(show symptom)× (1− piAn)×
(
1− 1
infToSympTime
− contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× likOfBeingInfected
)
+ symptomFrac×
[(
βhI¯
t
An(1− piAn) + β`I¯tAi (1− piAi) + β`I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tAn (1− piAn)
]
.
• Non-infected Symptomatic-Isolated Compartment (NSi):
Inflow: The inflow to the NSi compartment has two sources:
– Non-infected asymptomatic-nonisolated (NAn) individuals who did not get tested and
developed symptoms caused by another condition or disease such as the seasonal flu. There
are N tAn + N
t
SipiSi + N
t
AipiAi such individuals. The rate that an individual develops symptoms
due to a non-COVID-19 disease is given by the parameter nonCOVIDSymptRate, which we
currently set at 1/1200; see Section C for more details on how we arrive at this number.
– Non-infected asymptomatic-isolated (NAi) individuals can also develop flu-like symptoms.
There are N tAi × (1− piAi) such individuals.
Outflow: The outflow from the NSi compartment has three destinations:
– Individuals who are tested will return negative and move to the NAn compartment. This causes
them to increase their contact with other individuals.
– Some individuals will become infected from coming in contact with infected people.
– Individuals leave self-quarantine at a rate of 1/selfQuarTime, where selfQuarTime is the
average time that an individual self-isolates. We currently set this value to 10 days.
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Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
N t+1Si = N
t
Si × (1− piSi)×
(
1 − 1
selfQuarTime
− β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
))
+ nonCOVIDSymptRate× (N tSipiSi + N tAi + N tAn) .
• Non-infected Asymptomatic-Isolated Compartment (NAi):
Inflow: The inflow to the NAi compartment comes from individuals in the NAn compartment who
reduce their exposure to other individuals after being identified as a close contact. The number
of such individuals is given by
contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× (N tAn + N tSipiSi + N tAipiAi) ,
where contactPerPosCase is the average number of contacts per positive case, currently set
at 4, and H¯ denotes the total number of high-contact individuals; see the discussion in the IAi
compartment.
Outflow: The outflow from the NAi compartment has four destinations.
– Individuals who are tested will test negative and move to the NAn compartment, end their
self-isolation, and increase their contacts.
– Untested individuals leave self-isolation at a rate of 1/selfQuarTime.
– Some individuals will become infected and move to the IAi compartment.
– Some individuals will develop flu-like symptoms but not COVID-19, at the rate of
nonCOVIDSymptRate.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
N t+1Ai = N
t
Ai × (1− piAi)×
(
1 − 1
selfQuarTime
− nonCOVIDSymptRate
− β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
))
+ contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× (N tAn + N tSipiSi + N tAipiAi) .
• Non-infected Asymptomatic-Nonisolated Compartment (NAn):
Inflow: The inflow to the NAn compartment comes from three sources. First, individuals from the
NSi compartment recover from non-COVID-19 symptoms at a rate of
1
selfQuarTime
. Second,
individuals from the NAi compartment leave self-isolation and increase their contact with others
at a rate of
1
selfQuarTime
. Third, individuals from the NSi and NAi compartments who test
negative will also increase their contact rates.
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Outflow: The outflow from the NAn compartment has three destinations. First, some individuals
are identified as close contacts and move to the NAi compartment, thereby reducing their contact
levels. Second, other individuals will develop flu-like symptoms independent of COVID and move
to theNSi compartment at the rate of nonCOVIDSymptRate. Third, some individuals will become
infected and move to the IAn compartment.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
N t+1An =
(
N tAn + N
t
SipiSi + N
t
AipiAi
)
×
(
1 − nonCOVIDSymptRate − contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
−
(
βhI¯
t
An(1− piAn) + β`I¯tAi (1− piAi) + β`I¯tSi (1− piSi)
))
+
N tAi(1− piAi)
selfQuarTime
+
N tSi(1− piSi)
selfQuarTime
.
• Recovered Symptomatic-Isolated Compartment (RSi):
Inflow: The inflow to the RSi compartment has two sources. Recovered asymptomatic-nonisolated
(RAn) and recovered asymptomatic-isolated (RAi) individuals, who did not get tested, can develop
flu-like symptoms independent of COVID-19, at the rate of nonCOVIDSymptRate.
Outflow: The outflow from the RSi compartment occurs from individuals who recover from non-
COVID-19 symptoms at the rate of 1/selfQuarTime.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
Rt+1Si = R
t
Si × (1− piSi)×
(
1 − 1
selfQuarTime
)
+ nonCOVIDSymptRate× (RtSipiSi + RtAi + RtAn) .
• Recovered Asymptomatic-Isolated Compartment (RAi):
Inflow: The inflow to the RAi compartment comes from individuals in the RAn compartment who
reduce their exposure to other individuals after being identified as a close contact. The number
of such individuals is given by
contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× (RtAn + RtSipiSi + RtAipiAi) ,
Outflow: The outflow from the RAi compartment has two destinations. First, untested individuals
leave isolation at the rate of 1/selfQuarTime. Second, other individuals will develop symptoms
independent of COVID-19, at the rate of nonCOVIDSymptRate.
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Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
Rt+1Ai = R
t
Ai × (1− piAi)×
(
1 − 1
selfQuarTime
− nonCOVIDSymptRate
)
+ contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× (RtAn + RtSipiSi + RtAipiAi) .
• Recovered Asymptomatic-Nonisolated Compartment (RAn):
Inflow: The inflow to the RAn compartment has six sources:
– Untested people from the ISi compartment who recovered naturally.
– Untested people from the IAi compartment who recovered naturally.
– Untested people from the IAn compartment who recovered naturally.
– People from the RAi and RSi compartments who test negative.
– People from the RAi compartment who leave self-quarantine.
– People from the RSi compartment whose non-COVID-19 symptoms disappeared.
Outflow: The outflow from the RAn compartment occurs in two ways. First, some individuals
are identified as close contacts and move to the RAi compartment. Second, some individuals will
develop symptoms independent of COVID-19, at the rate of nonCOVIDSymptRate.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
Rt+1An =
(
RtAn + R
t
SipiSi + R
t
AipiAi
)
×
(
1 − nonCOVIDSymptRate − contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
)
+
RtAi(1− piAi)
selfQuarTime
+
RtSi(1− piSi)
selfQuarTime
+
I¯tSi(1− piSi)
sympToRecoveryTime
+
I¯tAi(1− piAi)
asympToRecoveryTime
+
I¯tAn(1− piAn)
asympToRecoveryTime
.
• Known Infected Compartment (KI): This compartment has two sub-compartments, with
KIt =
(
KIt(hospitalized), Ht(recovered)
)
and we have the following dynamics.
Inflow: There are three sources of inflow. The infected individuals in ISi, IAi, and IAn
compartments who are tested. We assume that individuals from the ISi(hospitalized) sub-
compartment flow into the KIt(hospitalized) sub-compartment, and that individuals from the
ISi(recovered) sub-compartment flow into the KI
t(recovered) sub-compartment. We assume
that hospOutOfSymptFrac (20%) of the individuals from the IAi and IAn compartments require
hospitalization, while the remaining 1 - hospOutOfSymptFrac = 80% will recover naturally.
Outflow: Individuals who require hospitalization move to the H compartment at the rate of
1/infToHospTime, where infToHospTime represents the average time until an infected person
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requires hospitalization. We currently set this to 5 days. Individuals who will recover move to the
KR compartment at the rate of 1/sympToRecoveryTime, where sympToRecoveryTime denotes
the average recovery time. We set this to 14 days.
Update Equations: Let recoverOutOfSymptFrac = 1− hospOutOfSymptFrac = 80%. Then,
KIt+1(recovered) =
(
KIt(recovered) + ItSi(recovered)piSi + I
t
Ai(recovered)piAi + I
t
An(recovered)piAn
+ recoverOutOfSymptFrac× [ItAi(sympt.)piAi + ItAn(sympt.)piAn])
×
(
1− 1
sympToRecoveryTime
)
,
KIt+1(hospitalized) =
(
KIt(hospitalized) + ItSi(hospitalized)piSi
+ hospOutOfSymptFrac× [ItAi(sympt.)piAi + ItAn(sympt.)piAn])
×
(
1− 1
infToHospTime
)
.
• Hospitalization Compartment (H): This compartment has two sub-compartments, with
Ht =
(
Ht(die), Ht(recovered)
)
.
Inflow: There are two sources of inflow to the hospitalization compartment: the infected
individuals from the ISi and KI compartments who require hospitalization. We assume that a
fraction deathFrac, currently set at 1/3, of the inflow to the hospitalization compartment will
die. We assume the remaining 1− deathFrac = 2/3 will recover.
Outflow: Individuals who die leave the hospital at the rate of 1/hospToDeathTime, where
hospToDeathTime is the average time between hospitalization and death. Individuals who
will recover move to the KR compartment at the rate of 1/hospToRecoveryTime, where
hospToRecoveryTime is the average time between hospitalization and recovery. We currently
set both to 14 days.
Update Equations: Let recFrac = 1 − deathFrac = 2/3. We have the following update
equations.
Ht+1(die) = Ht(die)×
(
1− 1
hospToDeathTime
)
+
deathFrac
infToHospTime
×
(
ItSi(hosp.)× (1− piSi) + KIt(hosp.) + ItSi(hosp.)piSi
+ hospOutOfSymptFrac× [ItAi(sympt.)piAi + ItAn(sympt.)piAn]
)
,
Ht+1(recovered) = Ht(recovered)×
(
1− 1
hospToRecoveryTime
)
+
recFrac
infToHospTime
×
(
ItSi(hosp.)× (1− piSi) + KIt(hosp.) + ItSi(hosp.)piSi
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+ hospOutOfSymptFrac× [ItAi(sympt.)piAi + ItAn(sympt.)piAn]
)
.
• Known Recovery Compartment (KR):
Update Equations: Let recoverOutOfSymptFrac = 1 − hospOutOfSymptFrac = 80%. We have
the following update equations.
KRt+1 = KRt +
Ht(rec.)
hospToRecoveryTime
+
KIt(rec.)
sympToRecoveryTime
+
ItSi(rec.)piSi + I
t
Ai(rec.)piAi + I
t
An(rec.)piAn
sympToRecoveryTime
+
recoverOutOfSymptFrac×
[
ItAi(sympt.)piAi + I
t
An(sympt.)piAn
]
sympToRecoveryTime
.
• Death Compartment (D):
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
Dt+1 = Dt +
Ht(die)
hospToDeathTime
+
ItSi(death)
sympToDeathTime
.
C. Model Parameters and Their Estimated Values
In this section, we discuss how we obtain the estimates for different model parameters.
Estimating Flow Rates Between Compartments:
We assume an incubation period of 5 days [11]. After an individual develops symptoms, we
assume it takes another 5 days for the individual to become hospitalized [18]. Specifically, we
set infToSympTime = infToHospTime = sympToHospTime = 5.
We set the recovery time for symptomatic individuals to be 14 days. In our model, we do
not differentiate between recovery at home versus at the hospital and set sympToRecoveryTime =
hospToRecoveryTime = 14. We set the time for a symptomatic individual to die to be 14 days.
Similar to the recovery time, we do not differentiate between deaths at home versus at the hospital
and set both sympToDeathTime = hospToDeathTime = 14 [11].
We assume that individuals who self-isolate after being identified as a close-contact or develop
symptoms from a non-COVID-19 illness spend an average of 10 days reducing their contact with
others. While the WHO recommends a quarantine period of 14 days, the CDC gives a less stringent
recommendation of 10 days [2]. We set selfQuarTime = asympToRecoveryTime = 10.
In our model, non-infected and recovered individuals develop symptoms due to non-COVID-19
diseases at a rate of nonCOVIDSymptRate = 11200 . This rate is based on the assumption that 10%
of the population is infected over the course of 4 months. This is roughly estimated using the flu
symptom rate in past years as reported by the CDC [3]. We set N = 10, 490, 000, the population
of North Carolina in 2020. We also assume that 34, 966 individuals, corresponding to 0.3% of the
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population, initially has symptoms due to the seasonal flu. This is calculated assuming that flu
symptoms last for an average of 4 days.
Estimating Disease Dynamics:
We use sympOutOfInfFrac to denote the fraction of COVID-19 infected individuals who develop
symptoms. Numerous reports have given different estimates for this fraction: from 82% on the
Diamond Princess cruise ship [10] to roughly 40% on the USS Theodore Roosevelt [16]. We set
sympOutOfInfFrac = 50%.
The parameter hospOutOfSympFrac denotes the fraction of symptomatic individuals who need
hospitalization. We set this value to be 20%. The parameter deathOutOfHospFrac denotes the
fraction of hospitalized individuals who die. We set this value to be 33.3¯%. Both of these values
are roughly estimated using historical hospitalization and death numbers as reported by New York
City [15]. Finally, we assume that some portion of the infected population die at home without
hospitalization. We denote this portion as deathOutOfInfFrac and set it to 2%. We estimate this
value using the number of probable deaths as reported by the City.
Infection Dynamics and Estimating Contact Rates:
The basic reproductive number, R0, captures the average number of new infections produced by
each infected individual. There are numerous recent studies estimating the value of R0 for COVID-
19. These estimates vary widely, from anywhere between 2.2 [9] and 5.7 [17]. Furthermore, it
is possible that R0 varies across different countries and cities due to climate, environmental, and
sociological differences. As a result, we set R0 = 3.04 according to a tuning procedure using
historical hospitalization and death statistics as reported by North Carolina. We briefly discuss the
details of this procedure in Section D.
The rate of new infections is controlled by β, the contact rate between infected and non-infected
populations. In a standard compartmentalized model, the number of new infections during any
time period is captured by
β × {# of non-infected individuals} × {# of infected individuals}.
In our model, we have a similar term for every pair of infected and non-infected compartments. We
employ two different contact rates βh and β`, so we differentiate their usage according to whether
we are considering isolating or non-isolating compartments.
We set βh =
R0
N×sympToRecoveryTime and use this as the contact rate between infected and
non-infected compartments that are both non-isolating. When at least one of the compartments
is isolating or symptomatic, we assume that contact between these populations is reduced by one
third and use the contact rate β` =
2
3 × R0N×sympToRecoveryTime .
Beginning on March 27, we reduce both βh and β` by a factor of 1/2. This reduction is due to
social distancing measures associated with the NC stay-at-home order. We set this reduction to 1/2
according to data from IHME that reports that starting April 1, mobility in North Carolina was
reduced by approximately 50% [6]. On May 8, we assume that Phase 1 relaxes social distancing
to 25% of the stay-at-home level. On May 22, we assume that Phase 2 relaxes social distancing to
50% of the stay-at-home level.
Dynamics of Contact Tracing:
The parameter contactPerPosCase denotes the average number of close contacts that are identified
via tracing for each COVID-19 positive individual. We assume that close contacts are always
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identified from within the non-isolating population. To estimate contactPerPosCase and the
proportion of infected and non-infected individuals within the close-contact group, we use the
results of [1], a comprehensive study on contact tracing. This study reports the results of contact
tracing in Shenzhen, China but the index cases are mostly travelers arriving from Hubei province.
(To the best of our knowledge there are no detailed studies on contact tracing in the United
States. Therefore, we use findings reported for the Hubei province in China and its capital Wuhan
to estimate contactPerPosCase and to get a rough approximation for likOfBeingInfected as
explained in the following.)
In this study, the authors identified 1,286 close contacts based on 292 COVID-positive cases.
This suggests an average close contact group size of 1286/292 = 4.4 for each COVID-positive
individual identified. According to recent news articles, the state of Massachusetts, which has
recently initiated a comprehensive contact-tracing effort, found that the average close contact group
size is two [12]. Therefore, we set the parameter contactPerPosCase to 4 in our model.
The parameter likOfBeingInfected is a multiplier that captures how much more likely it is for
an infected individual to be identified as a close contact as compared to a non-infected individual
and therefore can be seen as a measure of the effectiveness of contact tracing. Specifically,
likOfBeingInfected =
P (close-contact | infected)
P (close-contact | non-infected) .
It would be reasonable to consider settings where likOfBeingInfected ≥ 1 only since if contact
tracing is of any value at all it should make randomly chosen infected people more likely to
be identified as close-contact than non-infected people. In order to get at least some rough
approximation for likOfBeingInfected, we use the following approach:
We can show that
likOfBeingInfected =
P (infected | close-contact)
P (non-infected | close-contact) ÷
P (infected)
P (non-infected)
.
Thus, we need estimates for the proportion of infected versus non-infected individuals within the
non-isolating population as well as the proportion of infected versus non-infected individuals among
people identified as close contacts. Of the 1,286 close contacts studied in [1], 98 tested positive.
Thus, we estimated the proportion of the infected to non-infected within the close contact group
to be P (infected|close-contact)/P (non-infected|close-contact) = 98/1188 = 0.082.
Next, we estimate P (infected)/P (non-infected), the proportion of infected to non-infected in
the general non-isolating population, using findings of studies done on data collected from Wuhan
around the same time the study discussed in [1] was conducted. According to [8], in Wuhan, the
probability of death after developing symptoms was 1.4%. Using this estimate and the number of
deaths in Wuhan, which is reported as 4,512 by the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center [7],
we can estimate the total number of infected individuals in Wuhan over the course of the pandemic
(at least as of now) to be 322,286. In order to estimate the total number of infected individuals at
some random time between mid-January and mid-February, we divide this by two and use 161,143 as
the average number of infected individuals at a given time. This approximation implicitly assumes
a linear build-up of new COVID-positive cases, which is not true for infection spread within a
population, but nevertheless serves as a reasonable rough estimate. Then, using 11,000,000 for
the population of Wuhan, we estimate P (infected)/P (non-infected) to be 161, 143/(11, 000, 000 −
161, 143) = 0.015.
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Finally, using our estimates for the infected to non-infected proportion within the close-contacts
and within the general non-isolating population, we estimated the ratio of these two proportions to
be 0.082/0.015 = 5.47. Clearly, this is a very rough approximation and it would not be reasonable
to reach conclusions based on results only on this estimated value. Therefore, in our analysis we
consider scenarios that assume different values around 5.47. Specifically, in the main body of the
paper, we report results based on three settings with likOfBeingInfected set to 2, 5, and 10,
respectively corresponding to increasing levels of contact tracing effectiveness.
D. Model Validation
We manually calibrated two parameters of the model to roughly match its output to the observed
trajectory of the pandemic up until April 15. These two parameters are the R0 value and the
initial number of infected asymptomatic-nonisolated individuals on March 2. We ended up with
an R0 value of 3.04 and an initial infected asymptomatic-nonisolated population of 676. These
starting parameters are tuned based on hospitalization, death, and test data up to June 15. We
use testing data from the NC Department of Health and Human Services. We assume that the
tests are conducted daily on people in the order of symptomatic, isolated, and finally non-isolated
people.
The plots in Figure 7 show the epidemic trajectory as predicted by our model. In particular,
Figure 7a shows the total number of currently hospitalized, symptomatic infected, asymptomatic
infected and known infected people on each day as projected by the model. In Figure 7b, we
compare the cumulative number of deaths predicted by our model with the actual cumulative
number of deaths. In Figure 7c, we plot the actual daily number of tests conducted and positive
cases found in North Carolina. We use the same historical testing capacity in our model. We set
the testing capacity to 30,000 for future projections in this plot. Note that the daily number of
positive tests in our model fluctuates because we use the actual number of tests performed in North
Carolina until June 15 as the number of tests performed in our model. However, the number of
positive cases identified in our model emerges from the internal behavior of our model. The fit
between the model and the actual trajectory in terms of positive cases is reasonably good. Figure
7d shows the daily number of active hospitalizations reported by North Carolina against the number
of hospitalizations projected by our model.
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(a) Population overview
(b) Cumulative deaths
(c) Daily new cases
(d) Daily active hospitalizations
Figure 7: Comparison of the actual trajectory of the pandemic and the model.
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